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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
FOR THE JUVENILE
By
TED RUBIN*
RICHARD S. SHAFFER**

judge Rubin and Mr. Shaffer engage in an intriguing analysis
of the juvenile court system today. Their discussion focuses on the
challenge posed by the injection of constitutional safeguards into
that system. The authors demonstrate by analysis the lack of due
process in the present system and the resultant failure of the primary
purposes of the juvenile court. To maintain the integrity of the
juvenile court, it is necessary to consider methods of acquiring constitutional protections for the juvenile. The authors conclude that adoption of basic safeguards into the present juvenile system will realize
great rewards for the system and the child. These rewards far outweigh the practical difficulties that would be encountered in the
adoption of the recommended constitutional protections.
INTRODUCTION

T

HE revolutionary introduction in 1899 of the juvenile court into

a previously two-pronged civil and criminal judicial system was
accompanied by the magnificent hopes of its creators. One such
hope was that individualized justice for the child would henceforth
be a reality.
Today we are in the midst of a second transformation: procedural safeguards traditionally reserved for the criminal system
are being injected into the juvenile system. The authors propose to
examine the historical development of the juvenile court system, the
current practices within the system, and the necessity for completing
this transformation now in progress.
Beginning in the 1870's, the judicial system was severely criticized, in part, for its inability to adapt to new legal problems which
accompanied urbanization.' The increased crime rate, domestic problems, small claims of individuals, and youthful offenders of the
law2 were of mounting concern to reformers. It was against this
background that the juvenile court was born. Specialization of the
courts was hopefully a panacea for the ills of the former system.
Hence, in addition to the creation of small claims courts, municipal
* Judge, Denver Juvenile Court, Denver, Colorado; B.A., Penn. State Univ., 1948;
M.S.S.A. Western Reserve Univ., 1960; J.D., De Paul Univ., 1956.
* * B.A., Dickinson Univ., 1964; J.D., Univ. of Denver, 1966.
1 See HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW, ch. 8 (1950); Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 19 A.B.A. REP. 395
(1906).
2 HURST, op. cit. supra note 1.
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courts for traffic offenders, and domestic relations courts, the juve-

nile court arose.8
Noble intentions accompanied the development of the juvenile
court. The court "avoids the stigma ' 4 which attaches to criminal
court charges. It "made the child visible" 5 in a proceeding conducive to individualized justice. The court would provide care which
would "approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given
by its parents.''6 "[T]he judge and all concerned were merely trying
to find out what could be done on his behalf."' As one writer stated,
"[E]mphasis is laid, not on the act done by the child, but on the
social facts and circumstances that are really the inducing causes of
the child's appearance in court. The particular offense which was
the immediate and proximate cause of the proceedings is considered
only as one of the many other factors surrounding the child. The
purpose of the proceeding here is not punishment but correction of
conditions, protection of the child, and care and prevention of a recurrence through the constructive work of the court. Conservation of
the 'child' as a valuable asset of the community, is the dominant
note."8 Unfortunately not all of these goals have been attained.'
I.

THE JUVENILE COURT TODAY

A.

Comparison with the Adult System
To place the juvenile proceeding in perspective, a brief comparison between the juvenile system and the adult criminal system
will be made. When contrasted with the juvenile system, the criminal system has two distinct characteristics: the proceeding is formal
and punishment is a primary purpose. The criminal action is generally brought against the defendant by the district attorney representing the people. The defendant is usually represented by counsel
either of his own selection or by court appointment. The trial
is an adversary proceeding. The parens patriae philosophy of the
juvenile court"° is absent in the criminal court. In the latter, the
3 Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Court, 1 J. FAM. L. 151

(1961).
4Schramm, Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, 261 Annals 101 (1949).
5 Lathrop, quoted in LUNDBERG, UNTO THE LEAST OF THESE, 119 (1947).
6
ILL. ANN. STAT. § 701 (Supp. 1965).
7Addams, quoted in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 14 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
8 FLEXNER & BALDWIN, JUVENILE COURTS AND PROBATION, 6-7 (1916).
9 See generally Sloane, Juvenile Court. An Uneasy Partnership of Law and Social

Work, 5 J. FAM. L. 170 (1965), which suggests that the conflict between legal and
social norms is at the root of the fundamental problems of the juvenile courts.
10A typical definition of the doctrine is:
The term parens patriae is defined as the father or parent of his country;
in England, the King; in America, the people; the government is thus
spoken of in relation to its duty to protect and control minor children
and guard their interests.
Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 305, 41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950).
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prevailing attitude is that if the defendant has violated the law he
should be punished.
Due process safeguards are more prominent in criminal proceedings; the requirement of these protections has been specifically
set forth by appellate court decisions." These decisions have expressly enunciated the application of the fifth, fourteenth and other
amendments to the procedures related to the adult system of criminal justice. But the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled
only once on a juvenile delinquency case,' 2 and there have been
comparatively few appellate court decisions regarding delinquency.
Accordingly, there is no pervading constitutional application of due
process to juvenile proceedings. In its absence the juvenile correctional system has inconsistently and on a piecemeal basis interpolated
criminal due process safeguards to the juvenile.' 3 As a result juvenile courts have applied ad hoc a procedural yardstick of funda4
mental fairness.'
The criminal system adheres more stringently to the common
law requisites of a crime, i.e., mens rea and actus reus. The juvenile
system on the other hand is premised on the principle that a child
has only an incomplete ability to formulate the criminal intent necessary to violate a law. Less severe sanctions are therefore utilized in
the juvenile system, partly because of the incomplete mens rea."
Traditionally, the rehabilitation of the child was more important to the juvenile court than the adjudicative determination of a
law violation, and probation counselors were employed to aid in
this objective.
In many juvenile courts the probation staffs are still hired by
the judge. This situation may diminish the working independence
of the staff in that its work conforms to the views of the judge.
This situation exists even when juvenile probation staffs are not
hired directly by the judge. In the adult system there is less dialogue
between judge and probation staff, and frequently even less between
probation staff and probationers. Although case loads are higher
than desirable in most juvenile courts, case loads are generally far
11 In

re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952) ; People v. Fitzgerald,
244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523,
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
12 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
13 See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; In re Williams, 49
Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 '(1966).
14 See Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In re
Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1966); Welch, Delinquency Proceedings- Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum,
50 MINN. L. REV. 653, 664-694 (1966).
'5See Westbrook, Mens Rea in the Juvenile Court, 5 J. FAM. L. 121 (1965), which
emphasizes that the traditional concept of mens rea is not applicable to juvenile proceedings. It should be used only as an objective criteria which must be satisfied
before a violation can be found.
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heavier in the adult system. As a result probation counseling is far
more standardized and less intensive than in the juvenile system.
Most adult probation workers seem to be less adequately trained
than juvenile court staffs. Even so, untrained staff members in both
systems have often performed effectively. The limited professionalism in the juvenile probation and parole system has been partially
counteracted by the employment of psychological and psychiatric
personnel affiliated with the courts and by rather close liaison with
child guidance and mental health clinics. Mental health professionals are still primarily used in the juvenile system for diagnostic
recommendations and occasional treatment, but are increasingly
being used as staff trainers and consultants. The adult system has
not utilized mental health personnel nearly as much, confining them
primarily to diagnostic procedures in determining whether or not
an adult offender is criminally insane.
Juvenile probation officers are involved with the child and his
family very early in the process, obtaining a social history and beginning the rehabilitative relationship. Adult officers, on the other
hand, because of a less flexible system, wait and approach their
task more formally.
Juvenile courts utilize detention home care for children pending official disposition, although detention facilities are grossly
inadequate throughout the country. Certain courts have developed
this temporary detention into a constructive experience for the child,
in contrast to the usually sterile experience in the city or county jail
for the adult offender.
Attorneys who practice in criminal courts frequently have difficulty making the transition to a juvenile court case. They are not
accustomed to a non-adversary proceeding, and their understanding
of the juvenile system is hampered by a general lack of orientation
to this court during law school training.1 6 Despite this, they do tend
to give more total consideration to the effect of this proceeding
upon the child. For example, a lawyer in juvenile court may recommend that the youthful client admit responsibility to a petition in
order to help the child develop an improved concept of responsibility and honesty. In the adult court, a lawyer more frequently
sees his duty as providing an adequate defense rather than encouraging his client to admit to guilt in clear cases of guilt. One reason
for this difference may be the more severe sanctions possible for
the offender in the criminal court.
The right to be represented by counsel has not been clearly
defined for juvenile courts, although it appears likely that counsel
16 Skoler & Tenney, Jr., Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAM. L. 77
(1964).
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will be provided in some situations to the youthful offender.' Juvenile court procedures are not as well-defined by statute or court
decision as those in the adult system. Children far more frequently
admit to the petition than do adults to the information or indictment.
The adult receives greater notice of his rights and the procedures
affecting him than does the child. Moreover, juvenile judges not
infrequently lack legal training, whereas such training is a prerequisite to being a judge in the criminal system.
B. Institutingthe Juvenile Proceeding
Turning specifically to the juvenile system, the juvenile court
proceeding is characterized as civil in nature. 8 The action is commenced by the state through a delinquency petition, not against the
juvenile offender, but rather on his behalf. Once the petition has
been filed, the court must either sustain or dismiss the petition.
While the quantum of proof requisite for conviction, "beyond a
reasonable doubt," has never been in doubt for the adult system,
no specific standard has yet been established to adjudicate delinquency in juvenile courts. The juvenile court has alternative standards of proof available to adjudicate delinquency. Since the proceeding is civil, the court may apply either a preponderance of the
evidence"s or a clear and convincing standard;2° it may also elect
to apply the higher criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt."'" Judges are not uniform in the application of any of these
criterion. For example, at a meeting of judges in Colorado in 1966,
three judges indicated that they each utilized a different quantum
of proof. It is clear that inconsistencies and unequal justice may
17For legislation providing a right to assigned counsel for indigent juvenile offenders,
see CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 507 (1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 728

(1963). See Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 585
(1965) (foresees assumption by legal profession of responsibility to represent children
in juvenile court) ; Skoler & Tenney, Jr., Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court,
4 J. FAM. L. 77 (1964) (predicting other states will enact legislation providing
right to counsel).
18Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ; United States v. Borders, 154 F. Supp.
214 (N.D. Ala. 1957) ; Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928) ; Re
Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171,
183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1932) ; State v. Thomasson, 275 S.W.2d
463 (Tex. 1955); State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Ct., 139 Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409
(1926); McKesson, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, 45 MINN L. REV.
843 (1961).
19See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709
(1932) ; State v. Ferrell, 209 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) ; Robinson v. State,
204 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Ct., 139
Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409 (1926).
20
See, e.g., Holley Coal Co. v. Globe Ind. Co., 186 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Jensen
v. Housley, 297 Ark. 742, 182 S.W.2d 758 (1944) ; Lynch v. Lichtenthaler, 85 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 193 P.2d 77 (1948) ; In re Mazanec's Estate, 204 Minn. 406, 283
N.W. 745 (1939); Coddington v. Jenner, 57 N.J. Eq. 528, 41 At. 874 (1898);
First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 Pac. 691 (1923 ).
21In re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N.Y. Supp. 765 (1931) (juvenile court case).
But see In re Bigesby, 202 A.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (juvenile court case).
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occur when judges within the same state apply a different standard
of proof. A case now pending before the United States Supreme
Court2 2 hopefully will determine the appropriate measure.

Following the adjudication of delinquency, the court must make
its finding and order. The court customarily hears a report from
the probation counselor before making its final order. This report
is usually oral and concerns the environmental factors surrounding
the child. The court will then enter its order, which is read in open
court to the child and his parents.
C. Sentencing the Juvenile

Numerous alternatives for disposition are available to the judge,
ranging from institutionalization of the juvenile to placing him on
probation. Currently in some states the court may maintain jurisdiction over a child for as long as eleven years.2 3 Juvenile courts frequently impose indeterminate sentences on the child. In this manner the juvenile proceedings often result in longer periods of restriction or incarceration for juveniles than the courts are allowed to
impose on an adult found guilty of a similar crime.2 5
Since there is a reluctance on the part of a juvenile court judge
to take the child away from his parents and his home, the child is

frequently placed on probation. In the federal system, for example,
During the year ending June 30, 1960, 10,391 (38.9 percent)
adult offenders of a total of 26,728 sentenced and convicted in
federal courts were placed on probation, and 690 (48.3 percent)
of a total of 1,428 convicted2 and sentenced juvenile offenders were
granted the same privilege. 6
Probation is granted even more frequently in state juvenile courts.
Probation has long been employed to keep the family together
and to facilitate the child's adjustment in his familial environment.
While the juvenile is on probation legal authorities maintain careful
watch and control over the individual to assist the probationer in
his new start in life. Probation also serves as a control imposed
upon the wrongdoer to protect society from the recurrence of his
wrongful conduct. The court continues jurisdiction over the child
22Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965); appeal docketed, 34
U.S.L. WEEK 3409 (U.S. May 31, 1966) (No. 1273) ; prob. juris. noted, 34 U.S.L.

WEEK 3428 (U.S. June 21, 1966) (No. 1273) (No. 1273, 1966 Term; renumbered
No. 116, 1967 Term).
23
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-8-11 (1963).
AlIbid.
5Siler, Jr., The Need for Defense Counsel in the Juvenile Court, in 11 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 45, 56 (1965).
26 Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protection to Probation, 29
U. CL. L. REv. 483, 487 '(1962), citing The 1960 Ann. Rep. Administrative Office
of the United States Courts 304-09 (1961).
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during the probation period. Thus the court is enabled to supervise
the program of rehabilitation and reintegration of the juvenile.
Two major problems arise when considering probation in juvenile cases. The first is the nature of the rules and conditions imposed
on the probationer; the second concerns the procedure adopted for
the revocation of probation.
In juvenile as well as criminal cases, probation has traditionally
been treated as a matter of judicial "grace" and not a matter of
right. 7 Hence, certain conditions of probation have withstood challenges 28 of being cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment. They have also been held not violative of the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 29 However,
a condition requiring the probationer to attend Sunday School was
declared unconstitutional under the first amendment.3 0 The court
stated, "no civil authority has the right to require anyone to accept
or reject any religious belief or to contribute any support thereto."'3
One condition which is utilized is the suspension of the juvenile's drivers license. Despite the fact that many juvenile courts do
not have jurisdiction over traffic offenses, this condition may be
imposed." Moreover, this condition may be applied even when
offenses are not related to automobiles. The probation counselor
may feel that it is easier to control the individual if he does not
have extensive mobility.
Other conditions commonly applied include requiring school
attendance, restricting the probationer's associations, prohibiting the
frequenting of taverns,33 and ordering the probationer to obey his
parents. The requirement of attending school is a condition probably beneficial in most cases. However, if the probationer is above
the compulsory attendance age, the condition may be a method of
keeping him off the streets and under constant surveillance. Such
use may be of dubious value; the compulsory attendance statute is
designed to assist a child in attaining an education. If the child's
presence in court is caused by a problematic situation at school, such
a condition may not aid him in achieving an education, but may
only aggravate his problem. The condition should not be used when
this result seems likely.
2 Cf. Rubin, Sol, Probationand Due Process of Law, in 11 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
30 (1965).
28
Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945).
2People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957).
30
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
31 Id. at 344-345, 38 S.E.2d at 448.
32 Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 37 (1966).

3 Some states permit the sale of beverages with 3.2% alcohol content to minors after
they reach age eighteen.
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Utah has adopted a statutory provision enabling the juvenile
court judge to place the child on probation, but conditional upon
the child's parents undergoing medical, psychological, or psychiatric
treatment.8 4 This provision is not typical and would seem to infringe
upon the rights of the parents - especially since they are before
the court as guardians and not as violators of the law. On the other
hand, a condition requiring parental cooperation in a mental health
study of the child would not be subject to the foregoing objection.
Historically a mental health evaluation of the child has been
a common practice. Since the 1909 inauguration of the Chicago
Juvenile Court - related Juvenile Psychopathic Institute and the
Judge Baker Foundation in Boston in 1917, juvenile courts have
directly provided clinical evaluation of children or have arranged
for the examination at nearby child guidance or mental health
clinics. Even though the psychiatrists and psychologists could make
a greater overall contribution to a larger number of court-acquainted
children as staff trainers and consultants, their diagnostic and treatment plan recommendations in an advisory capacity can be extremely
valuable to judge and staff.
If the court decides to place the child on probation, but away
from his parents, restrictions may be placed upon parental visitation
rights. In such a case the child may be placed in a foster home,
through public or private child placing agencies, or in public or
private group care facilities, or in the juvenile detention home.
There is considerable reluctance to assign a child to the juvenile hall
for any extended period of time; usually it is a receiving center pending hearing. Because of the lack of other facilities, the detention
hall has also become the setting for enforced school attendance programs, headquarters for work programs, and a temporary placement
facility for children who have violated probation or who are awaiting placement away from home.
The court may decide to place the child on probation, but in
the home of a friend or relative. This condition enables the juvenile
to be in familiar surroundings, associating with people he knows.
Under these circumstances, conflicts may arise between the parents
and the persons caring for the child. With proper counseling, placement review, and work with the parents, however, these animosities
can be minimized.
Courts are increasingly developing work camps or day or weekend work programs as rehabilitation devices and as alternatives to
the delinquency institution. These are generally well accepted by
the public and offer ample opportunities for creative change in the
CODE ANN. § 55-10-84 (1953).
of 1965, 9 UTAH L. REv. 509 (1965).

3UTAH

See Winters, The Utah Juvenile Court Act
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child. But if poorly administered and arbitrarily used, these programs could pose difficulties in attaining the rehabilitative goal.
They may interfere with the normal schooling of the child, require
excessive or dangerous work, be programmed without corresponding
counseling, continue for unreasonable periods of time, or be essentially punitive in nature. Serious problems of due process would
arise with an ill-executed work program.
When juvenile courts exhaust available local sources and resort
to state facilities for institutionalization the preferable method is
for centralized commitment to the Youth Authority or to the appropriate state department administering the different state delinquency
programs. The state department should then determine which of
its facilities is most appropriate for the rehabilitation of the particular child. Transfers between state institutions - as from basic delinquency institution to the forestry camp - can thus be facilitated.
Although a judge may know particular juveniles and all state
facilities well enough to determine which facility will best meet the
individual's needs, the state department is in a better overall position to finally decide which facility should be utilized. Currently,
statutes vary on the method of commitment. As more states fulfill
their obligation to provide an array of alternatives, however, it is
hoped that more statutes will provide for this centralized commitment.
The correctional institutions in some states are stratified on the
basis of age. It is possible in a number of jurisdictions for both
criminal and juvenile courts to sentence offenders to the same reformatory. Since the criminal offender may be convicted under a
higher standard of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt, than that
which was applied in the juvenile court, the juvenile offender may
be denied equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Further,
no juvenile should be committed to a state penitentiary from the
juvenile court since the state penitentiary is clearly intended for
adjudicated criminals and a child cannot be adjudicated a criminal
in juvenile court.
D. Appeal by the Juvenile
Once the court has passed sentence on the offender, the juvenile has the right to appeal the court's decision. Presently this right
is rarely exercised. Reasons for failure to appeal may be the lack
of counsel in juvenile proceedings, inadequacy of notice of the right
to appeal, or inadequacy of notice of the right to appointive counsel
on appeal if indigent. Moreover, some juvenile courts fail to keep
or maintain adequate records which are insufficient transcripts on
which to base an appeal. Regardless of why there are few appeals,
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when they do occur, the record is protected to maintain the confidentiality of the name of the child.
If the juvenile has been placed on probation and violates the
conditions thereof, probation may be revoked by court. Notice and
hearing on the revocation of probation are not consistently required
35

for juveniles.
E. Waiver

At the onset of the juvenile proceeding or when an adjudicated
delinquent commits another offense, a serious problem of jurisdiction arises. In many states, the juvenile court and adult criminal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over felonies committed by sixteen and seventeen year old juveniles; hence, the juvenile court may
waive jurisdiction to the adult court. Such a determination may
depend upon the court in which the district attorney has brought
the action"0 or it may be made by the juvenile judge."7 The procedure followed in such cases may raise constitutional questions of
due process. 8
Juvenile court judges today may hesitate to apply the constitutional protection of the fourteenth amendment due to an incomplete understanding of "due process." Portions of the fifth and
sixth amendments specifically refer to criminal proceedings. 39 How-

ever, neither the fourth nor the fourteenth amendment is limited
to the criminal context. Because the juvenile proceeding is "civil"
in nature, the court may feel the protections afforded by these
amendments do not apply to juvenile hearings. But "due process
of law" is a broader concept which applies to civil as well as criminal hearings. Especially when the juvenile court is confronted with
a violator who may be subjected to punitive penalties, the distinction
between "civil" and "criminal" actions seems unrealistic. Hopefully
the courts are not basing their non-application of certain elements
of due process, such as the right to counsel, which have been delineated in a criminal context, on this fictitious distinction.
supra note 32 at 90. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 301.4, comment (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1954 and Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
36 People ex rel. Marks v. District Court of Adams County, 420 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1966).
37Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
38 Ibid.
35 Sheridan,

39"no person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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CRITIQUE OF PRESENT SYSTEM

Re-evaluation of the juvenile court has been stimulated by certain developments in the area of criminal law. Procedural safeguards guaranteed by the United States Constitution have been delineated more precisely than in the past. For example, protection
40
against unreasonable search and seizure, against prolonged detention, 41 against involuntary confessions,4 2 from arbitrary police practices,4 3 and of right to counsel 44 have recently been litigated in the

Supreme Court of the United States. By its decisions, the Court has
strengthened these protections and once again drawn attention to
the due process rights of criminal defendants.
Another factor contributing to this investigation of the juvenile
system has been the increasing incidence of juvenile crime. Congress,
recognizing this rapid increase, responded by passing the U.S. Juvenile Delinquency Control Act in 1961." As a result, comprehensive
community counterattacks on the causes of delinquency were launched
and were subsequently merged with anti-poverty programs, and
training centers for delinquency personnel were initiated. Manpower needs in this field were critical.
The critique which accompanied judicial attention to due process
in criminal cases and legislative enactments to control delinquency
was basically centered on two issues: the juvenile proceeding itself
and the staff and facilities of the juvenile system.
The juvenile proceeding poses numerous procedural problems
of due process. The juvenile court when created was not intended
to deny fundamental fairness to its participants. One purpose of
the system was to provide a fair hearing in an informal and flexible
atmosphere. But under the doctrine of parens patriae the system has
substituted a paternalistic standard for fairness which may not always
equal the due process standard.4
In the system today many juveniles confess to offenses. These
offenders are interrogated by the police before being charged. Under
the philosophy of the court, the rehabilitation of the child is more
easily ascertained when all the facts, no matter how discovered, are
before the court. But due process may require more; Miranda v.
U.S. 643 (1961).
41 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
42 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
40 Mapp v. Ohio, 367

43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
44 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45 Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act, 75 Stat. 572 (1961),
U.S.C. §§ 2541-48 (1961).

42

oSee note 10 supra for a definition of the parens patriae doctrine. See The Parens
Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers,
27 U. PrTT. L. REV. 894 (1966).
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Arizona47 and Gideon v. Wainwright48 may require that such interrogation only be in the presence of counsel or parent and that the
court appoint counsel to assist the indigent. Because of these decisions the parents and child may have to have notice of the hearings
and of their legal rights- including the right to remain silent.
Other constitutional problems are present. Must the juvenile be
granted a hearing at which he is represented by counsel for revocation of probation or parole, or when the juvenile court seeks to
waive jurisdiction?4" Must he be provided with counsel at the initial
proceeding and on appeal? What type notice must he have of his
legal rights? Are confessions, statements, and the evidence discovered from the information given in a confession or statement admissible into evidence at the hearing? Must the juvenile be granted
a hearing when he is transferred from the delinquency institution
to a reformatory - especially in light of the fact that the latter
usually requires a higher standard of proof for conviction and commitment than the former would? Finally, the problem remains of
whether the indeterminate sentence is valid and the continuing jurisdiction of the court constitutional- must these sentences be reviewed periodically?
Numerous other problems, in addition to the lack of constitutional safeguards, exist. Despite state statutes prohibiting the jailing
of children, 5° numerous juveniles are incarcerated in jails annually.
Children may be punished or their freedom restricted when they
51
have not committed a crime, e.g., for truancy or incorrigibility.
"Arithmetical justice" is frequently meted out to juveniles; for the
first offense, probation; for the second offense, suspended sentence
to a delinquency institution; for the third offense, institutionalization.
Overly restrictive conditions of probation are frequently imposed.
The present system frequently fails to adequately achieve reintegration of the child into society or to attain his rehabilitation.
In some cases non-court social or rehabilitative services would better
meet the needs of the child than the court proceeding. A mentally
retarded child, for example, generally needs specialized services,
not a court. The neglected or dependent child may be advantageously helped by social services rather than probation. Currently,
diverting such cases into these services is difficult prior to official
court consideration. New York is one state which adopted an intake
practice in juvenile courts to enable the court to authorize such
47 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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outside remedial measures before a petition is filed. That state also
allows court surveillance of a case without filing a petition.52 Such
a practice enables the number of delinquency petitions to be decreased and yet achieves rehabilitation of the child. Moreover the
court can focus attention on the more serious offenses.
In seeking rehabilitation of a child the present system does not
enable the child to fully appreciate the correctional process. An
indeterminate sentence may cause the juvenile to question the system
and consider it as harrassing him - he may not understand its rehabilitative goals. The purpose of the continuing jurisdiction of the
court during probation, of the parole authority, or of the correctional
institution should be fully and carefully explained to the child. The
jurisdiction should be subject to review at a given time to see if it is
still necessary. The necessity for periodic review becomes more
evident in light of the fact that a sequence of probation, institutionalization, and parole may extend over many years.
Probation poses other dilemmas such as the reasonableness of
the conditions. It would seem that overly strict conditions which
are unrelated to the offense charged would be so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate due process. The present system fails either
to recognize this problem or resolve it.
Moreover, if probation is revoked for violation of condition,
several due process questions arise. Must the juvenile have a hearing on his probation revocation? Does he have a right to counsel?
To appeal? Also, an equal protection problem may be present. Are
the probationers being treated equally when probation is revoked
summarily for violation of a probation condition, when the conditions imposed are neither uniform nor in conformity with any rational policy?
The current practice of providing a waiver proceeding allows
the more severe juvenile crimes to be treated more strictly in the
criminal courts and with the possibility of very severe penalty. Presently, the procedures surrounding the waiver hearing have come
under criticism as being a denial of due process. The legislature or
court, in allowing such a practice, seems to be protecting itself from
public criticism in the more severe cases. "The community, in general not yet convinced of the value of the experiments [juvenile
courts], is unwilling or unable to give up totally the satisfaction of
punishing wrongdoers in exchange for the dubious advantage of
rehabilitating them."' 53 Increased substantive protections are needed
before waiver should be allowed. And doesn't the waiver provision
52

53

N. Y. FAMILY CT. ACT,§§ 713,727, 759 (1963).
Gordon & Sargent, Waiver of Jurisdiction,in 9 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 121, 126
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represent our society's failure to provide adequate and effective
juvenile rehabilitative facilities? If we programmed sufficiently for
youth, we might eliminate the waiver procedure entirely.
The final criticism of the present system focuses on the transfer
of the adjudicated delinquent from one institution to another. If he
is transferred from a delinquency institution to the reformatory,
he is being penalized in the same manner as the criminal offender.
But the latter has been committed to the reformatory by a higher
standard of proof than would occur in the usual juvenile hearing.
Serious constitutional questions may arise. Typically a transfer is
without a hearing or representation by counsel. It is an administrative act based on various considerations. Nonetheless, it would seem
that the child should be allowed to have counsel, express himself
and understand what is happening to him.
III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to rectify and adjust the juvenile system to the legal
standards which it avoids, many alterations are necessary. Probably
a more significant one is to grant the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving minors. This change is needed to carry
out the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court, and to avoid
the arbitrariness of the current standard for waiver, i.e., waiving
jurisdiction depending on the age of the juvenile and severity of
the offense charged. Concomitant with this alteration, the juvenile
system will need better staffed institutions and more and better
trained personnel. Then the staff could strive to rehabilitate the
child and reintegrate him into society.
At the time of the delinquency petition, the child must be informed of his constitutional rights. These should include his right
to counsel, to remain silent, and to a full hearing. Once counsel
has been employed or appointed, interrogation and investigation of
the child could go on within a fairer context.
Because the court may institutionalize the offender or may
otherwise restrict his freedom, the authors feel that a uniform criterion for delinquency adjudication should be applied. This standard should be higher than that required in civil cases. A consistent
standard would avoid certain inequalities which may now occur in
juvenile courts.
After the adjudication of delinquency, the child and his parents
should be notified in writing of the right to appeal and to counsel
on appeal. If counsel has been provided throughout the proceeding,
the parents and child will have the court's order and finding explained to them; they will understand its impact and ramifications.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

Before sentence is rendered, the child, his parents, or counsel
should have the right to examine a copy of the probation counselor's
report prior to the disposition hearing. He can thus be in a position
to contest it or question its accuracy. This would enable the court
to know the facts more precisely. Moreover, the child should be
allowed to challenge the conditions for probation if they are arbitrary or unreasonable. He has a right to have them given to him
in writing and to have them explained to him. In this manner he
can begin to "know himself" if he understands the purpose of the
condition and why it was imposed.
The foregoing remarks apply with equal force to conditions
of parole. There should be written conditions for the continuation
of parole. Upon breach of a condition, parole or probation should
be revoked only after a hearing at which the child is represented
by counsel. Arbitrary revocation must be discontinued; the revocation hearing serves as a control on such activity. In addition to the
above, the child should have been given written notice of the revocation hearing and its cause, and of his right to counsel. In short,
the juvenile must have due process safeguards at any revocation
proceeding.
The need for continuing jurisdiction of the court by use of
probation must be reviewed by the court at periodic intervals. The
probationer should be brought before the court and the parolee before the parole authority and if the need for probation or parole
no longer exists, it should be removed. By the suggested review,
the juveniles will be treated fairly, but the jurisdiction of the court
or parole authority will last only as long as necessary- it will not
be a means of harassment or of arbitrary punishment at the whim
of an administrative official.
The principles underlying rules of probation or parole should
be reasonableness, relatedness to the offense, and expectation of
successful compliance. The child should be encouraged to comply
with and benefit from the terms of probation or parole. He should
not be confronted with conditions so unrelated as to be unreasonable or so harsh as to be impossible of compliance.
Changes must be implemented in the staff, facilities, and services of the juvenile court and the entire juvenile correctional system.
As the constitutional standards are provided juveniles, and as evaluative research reflects the inadequacies of the services provided, more
personnel will be required. These persons will require better training and orientation to the juvenile system.
An increased staff of social workers, skilled both in one-to-one
and group counseling, as well as better intake practices will be
required. Rather than coming before the court under a delinquency
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petition, more juveniles should be channeled into the mental health
clinic or other agency service which he may need more than the
services of a court. The court, itself, as these other services become
more available, may focus attention on the more serious offenders
who come before it. In the interim, courts should experiment with
shorter term probation for low risk cases.
Before a juvenile is transferred from a delinquency institution
to a reformatory, a hearing before the Youth Authority should be
held. Only in cases where the act committed by the youth, if done
by an adult would be a crime or where the youth has committed
a second offense which would be a crime, should transfer occur.
Review by the court of the administrative determination should be
afforded the juvenile.
Before the youth is transferred to a mental hospital or institution for the mentally retarded, a hearing must be held to ascertain
whether the evidence warrants such action. Once the statutory mandates are met, the transfer would be proper. However, the child
must be allowed to present evidence and litigate the transfer. The
alleged facts must be subject to challenges of inaccuracy and of
propriety of the action as to the individual being transferred. In
such cases a qualified guardian ad litem may appear for the child
to further clarify and represent the child's position, and to interpret
the proceeding, the reasons for, and hopefully the merits of transfer
to the child.
A. Youth Authority
Legislative policy determines whether the juvenile parole decision vests in the superintendent of the institution, a juvenile parole
board, or a division of a Youth Authority. Despite problems inherent
in each method, the authors recommend the Youth Authority model
as offering the greatest opportunity for program and administrative
efficiency and for consistency in the treatment of the delinquent
throughout the institutional and parole phases. 4 Due process and
good rehabilitative practice both require that the parole authority
systematically review the eligibility of each institutionalized child
for parole within a reasonable period of time following commitment. Such a system interposes a check on both the open-endedness
of the indeterminate sentence and on the institutional personnel who
would need to explain why the program has not successfully prepared a child for return to society.
The parole authority, which would be a division of the Youth
Authority, should establish standards for the granting of parole.
These standards for parole should be held out as a goal to each
54 See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE & INS'INS CODE §§ 1700-1803 (1966).
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institutionalized child. It should be clear that parole after a defined
institutional period is not a matter of right, but is a goal which can
be attained by each child. Broad discretionary powers should remain
with the parole authority, but standards would be beneficial to the
child and to the authority in the exercise of its discretion.
If the child has retained counsel, the parole authority should
grant the attorney the opportunity to participate fully in the parole
hearing. Such a practice will permit a thorough discussion of all
possible legal and sociological factors and enable the juvenile's case
to be accurately presented. In the absence of private counsel, an
attorney or guardian might be appointed. In either case the proceedings should be recorded. The opportunity to appeal to a court
should be granted in instances of an alleged abuse of discretion by
the parole authority or a contested fact issue.
B. Waiver Procedures
We should move to abolish waiver proceedings. A juvenile
court should serve all delinquent children and not just those who
are in their early teens or who have committed less serious offenses.
The key to the elimination of this proceeding is the accelerated
development of more extensive alternatives available to the court
or provided by state juvenile authorities. Improved services to the
sixteen and seventeen year old on both local and state levels would
eliminate the need for waiver and carry out the duty of the juvenile
court to provide rehabilitative care to all juveniles who commit
delinquent acts.
If waiver is not repealed, its consideration should be limited
to the sixteen and seventeen year old who commits a felony and
for whom no suitable program is available through juvenile services.
IV.

IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON THE PRESENT SYSTEM

The ramifications of incorporating the foregoing suggestions
into the present system would be numerous. A major need would
be massive educational efforts with specialists having contact with
juveniles and with the public at large. To achieve full value from
the proposed changes, the court, its staff, and the staff of related
services, e.g., the parole authority, must understand the aims underlying due process in the juvenile system.
High on the list of priorities would be the expanded training
of judges holding juvenile jurisdiction. These judges require additional education in the legal and constitutional aspects of their
specialized function, but legal training by itself is insufficient background. Graduate training and experience in social work, psychology, or sociology will be necessary for the most effective function-
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ing by the juvenile judge. Since such combined formal training is
rarely held by these judges, workshops and seminars to provide
clinical orientation and sensitivity training are crucial. The National
Council of Juvenile Court Judges has made an impressive start in
this direction with its institute series which has reached more than
1,000 judges in recent years. Such workshops and seminars also
place heavy emphasis on the legal aspects of juvenile court proceedings. State councils of juvenile judges are aiding the educational
movement to secure justice for the child.
Police officers, especially those with specialized juvenile functions, will require related training in the legal issues connected with
juveniles, particularly as it relates to their handling of a child.
Similar training is crucial for juvenile probation and parole officers,
and for those individuals who constitute the juvenile parole authorities in each state.
Law schools must expand their curriculum to include courses
dealing with children and to include materials on the youthful
offender and the law. Law students also need the practical experience of representing children who are respondents in juvenile court
cases. Local, state, and the American Bar Associations should encourage participation by their members in juvenile proceedings and
should sponsor seminars on the practice and philosophy of juvenile
courts.
Legislative revisions are critical as part of the educational strategies to achieve justice for the child. Legislators and citizen groups
concerned with children must take cognizance of these problems
surrounding the delinquent child and seek statutory reforms to overcome them.
The state-wide juvenile correctional systems should be integrated into a single state-wide juvenile authority which can implement consistent administrative methods and checks to provide due
process throughout the experience of the child in a state institution.
Well trained professionals, knowledgeable in the legal as well as
rehabilitation aspects of juvenile delinquency, must supervise the
state institutions, youth camps, parole programs, and the transfer
procedures between these state facilities.
Private attorneys will need to be appointed and paid from tax
funds to facilitate legal protection to juvenile offenders in some
communities. Increasingly, publicly employed legal counsel will be
necessary to provide legal representation to the growing numbers
of juveniles coming before the courts. Substantial amounts of time
will be required from law guardians, juvenile defenders, and public
and private agencies rendering legal services to the poor. Such
counsel should be available daily in juvenile courts and should be
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knowledgeable in law, legal procedures related to juveniles, and the
goals of rehabilitation.
A state-wide public defender may be necessary on the state
level to implement constitutional norms in appeals to higher courts.
This official may also be the easiest means to incorporate those
protections into parole granting and revocation hearings.
With more lawyers present in the pre-trial and adjudicative
stages of the juvenile court proceeding, more appeals from these
hearings can be expected. The appeals should be directed toward
clarification of delinquency statutes or delinquency procedures. By
the appeal, deficiencies in the rehabilitation practice and procedure
may also be challenged.
Judicial reorganization in many states is essential to the proposal. Juvenile judges should be attorneys to be qualified to serve
as judges. By this provision, the caliber of the bench will be improved commensurate with the improvement of attorneys appearing
before it.
To achieve the desired reintegration of the child into society,
considerable legislation and administrative changes will be necessary.
The radical differences between institutionalized life and community
life must be reduced. The institutionalized youth should relate to
the communtiy through recreational and cultural activities, school
and social activities, vocational training, and employment. Parental
relationships should concurrently be improved through professional
counseling and maintained by furlough visits.
CONCLUSION

The juvenile court experiment, when it began in 1899, was
never envisaged as being an instrument which would deny to the
child the basic principles of fairness. A major purpose of the juvenile court was to provide a fair hearing with all of the protections
due a child. Due process is one purpose of the juvenile court. This
purpose has not been met.5"
The juvenile court cannot continue in its present form and
achieve its primary purpose.56 Individualized justice for the child
encompasses rehabilitation of the child and reintegration of the child
into society. The present system, which shuns the adversary system
and prefers flexible and informal deliberations, denies consistent
legal protections to the child. As a result, the child does not under55
56

See generally Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How. L.J. 76
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See Moylan, Sr., Comments on the Juvenile Court, 25 MD. L. REV. 310 (1965),
which asserts that the early goals can be reached through a juvenile statute requiring
procedural safeguards and due process for the child.
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stand himself or the system. By incorporating constitutional safeguards into this system, individualized justice can become a reality.
Many problems arise in conjunction with these suggestions.
Police officers will dislike consistently involving an alleged delinquent's parents in notice of arrest, presence during questioning, and
clearer notification of legal rights, including the right to say nothing.
Probation officers will complain that the child and his parents will
not understand the legal rights explanation; they believe that the
child simply wants to admit to the complaint and not be confused
or delayed by interpretations of legal rights. Court clerks would
prefer to sabotage the production and service of new forms. County
commissioners would rather not spend greater public funds to provide for counsel for the indigent child. An overburdened juvenile
court judge will not be happy with any substantial increase in the
number of time-consuming contested matters.
By providing more lawyers in juvenile court, there will be more
cases where the lawyer asserts his expertise developed in criminal
courts. In some cases the lawyers may fail to consider that the child
may prefer to admit to a wrongful act rather than undergo the
anxiety of heavily argued and frequently continued motions and
trials. A successful dismissal on a procedural technicality may accelerate a child's belief than he can continue a delinquent pattern and
keep asking for a lawyer to beat future "raps." 5 7 Marginal income
families may expend badly needed money for private legal services
which bring the same result for their child as would have been
obtained without counsel. This situation could cause deteriorations
of the familial relationship and further rejection of the child.
Admittedly all of these problems may arise. However, they
can be minimized through expanded law school course offerings on
juvenile courts and delinquency. Practicing lawyers can be educated
through orientation and seminars. More important, if the court and
its staff as well as the state and community programs for juveniles
improve and are successful in the context of newly offered legal
protections, the result should be the maturation of the juvenile court
and the juvenile correction system.
Benefits from expanded legal services to children brought before the court would be numerous. 51 More lawyers will become
more interested in the goals and problems of the court and in court
and community service needs. More legislative reforms affecting
57 McLaughlin
58

& McGee, Juvenile Court Procedure, 17 ALA. L. REV. 226 (1965).
See Skoler & Tenney, Jr., Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAM. L.
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children's laws will be achieved; out-moded laws may be removed
from the books and clarification of existing laws would be possible.
Appeals to higher courts will be facilitated. In this way current
juvenile laws and procedures will be clarified, validated, or invalidated. Procedural fairness will be guaranteed the child at every
stage of the proceeding from pre-trial to post-trial phases.
Juvenile court proceedings should be conducted to achieve the
highest degree of child and parent participation in the process.
Although formal courtroom hearings emphasizing the court's authority and control may be most effective with certain children
selectively chosen for this type handling, usually greater success in
the majority of the cases will be achieved in the informal chamber
setting. The active involvement of the child and family in dialogue
with judge and staff should facilitate rehabilitative goals. The less
formal hearing seems more effective, in general, to the child's
greater comprehension of himself and his decision to achieve rehabilitation.
Police handling and questioning of juveniles will need to be
tailored to a new cloth. The Miranda precedent 5" would void many
juvenile court cases if the issues determined by that case were raised
in a typical juvenile delinquency matter. It is doubtful that the
average policeman on the street makes a clear statement to the child
as to his legal and constitutional rights before interrogating him.
It is even more dubious whether a child has the legal status to waive
his right to counsel and other rights without his parents being
present at the time of the alleged waiver.
Police and the courts have relied upon the child's admission
to the offense, especially with the numerous delinquencies which
are unwitnessed. Defense attorneys, whetted by Miranda, will obtain
suppressions of admissions and ultimate freedom for their childclient, even though the child may in fact have committed the delinquent act. To this degree due process may impede the purpose of
the court to bring a child to accountability and to rehabilitate him.
However, due process in this context can serve the heightened purpose of helping police officers and others who interrogate a child
to effectuate higher standards of fair handling.6 °
Due process will mean more lawyers; more lawyers will mean
more trials and more delays in dealing with the court docket; more
lawyers will mean more private and public costs; more lawyers will
mean more appeals; more lawyers will also mean more children
59 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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removed from detention to their homes pending trial; more lawyers
will mean more "guilty" children found innocent because of insufficient evidence produced at a trial; more lawyers will mean an
insistence on fair procedures at each step of the correctional system.
Again, although inconvenience and an occasional "injustice" may
occur because of this change, the gains should far outweigh the
disadvantages, and the goals for the juvenile court should come
closer toward achievement.
Due process as it is utilized more completely in revocation of
probation proceedings will slow down and sometimes prevent a
court's desire to banish a child to a state institution as quickly as
it can. But here, as elsewhere, the child's growing recognition of
his rights should help many children toward greater self assertion
in their daily lives, and, in generalized form, toward more successful
lives. This is one of the major purposes of the juvenile court system.
An increased number of hearings would also take place in the
juvenile parole granting and revocation sequences. In many states
this procedure is incompletely defined by statute, and personal hearings with the child have been discouraged or denied.6 1 Due process,
introduced to parole, would mean evidentiary consideration for
granting or non-granting of parole and its suspension or revocation.
Again, this will cause certain inconvenience and require more personnel, but the presence of due process should not impede, but in
fact should strengthen the system of juvenile parole.
Transfers between state institutions would be slowed and more
management problems could well be created if courts were required
to approve transfers instead of the common present procedure of
transfer by administrative decision. But sharply improved correctional institutions should reduce the need to transfer children between institutions when a child cannot now be handled in the original setting. For example, more disturbed children could be effectively handled in delinquency institutions without their transfer to
62
a mental hospital.
In summary, consistent due process in juvenile proceedings will
cause inconvenience, will cost considerable money and will, in isolated cases, hamper the most effective consideration of the needs
of a child. But the massive gains inherent in the application of this
concept can only result in the greater fulfillment of the purpose of
the juvenile court and its related agencies. A new model for the
juvenile court should develop and with it the heightened implementation of all goals in behalf of children.
The chairman of Colorado's Juvenile Parole Board, Mr. Goodrich Walton, told the
writers in August, 1966, that no child has appeared directly before the Board during
his six years as a member.
62 See GLASER, REALITY THERAPY (1965).
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